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JURISDICTION & NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Court of Appeals has appellant jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code §78-28-3(2)(a) since the order 
appealed from is a final order of the District Court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for the trial court's findings of 
fact is the clearly erroneous standard, Walton v. Walton, 814 
P.2d 619 (Utah App. 1991). 
I 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
a. Did the District Court conclude that in order for 
Defendant to obtain custody, he had to prove that the Plaintiff 
(mother) was unfit and did the trial court presume that the 
mother should have custody when all other factors were equal? 
b. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
disregarding the intent of the parents of Defendant when it 
awarded one half (1/2) of a home to Plaintiff as marital rather 
than separate property? 
c. Did the trial court commit error in determining the 
amount of income for Defendant based on historical earnings when 
he was under court order to continue to operate a business at an 
income of $1,000 a month? 
d. Was there sufficient evidence to support a findings 
that Defendant had removed money from the children's trusts 
accounts to invest in a business? 
I 
e. Did the trial court commit error in deciding the 
distribution of a business without the joinder of all interested 
parties? 
f. Did the trial court commit error in requiring Defendant 
to pay part of the cost of Plaintiff's witnesses? 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
The statutes and rules involved in this appeal are 
reproduced within the brief itself as permitted by Rule 24 (f) of 
the Rules of Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were married September 26, 1980 and separated in 
early 1993. (Record 316, Finding 26). They have four (4) minor 
children, ages 12, 10, 6 and 3. (Record 160 and 316) The Court 
entered a bifurcated decree of divorce on September 14, 1993, 
because Plaintiff claimed that she had to have a divorce in order 
to obtain Pell Grants to attend college. (Record 142) 
Plaintiff later admitted that she had falsely reported to 
the college that she was divorced and that the Pell Grant was 
already approved when she made her motion to bifurcate for a 
decree of divorce before trial. (Transcript of 1/20/94, page 135) 
The parties were married in California and lived there for 
three (3) years before moving to Utah in 1984. (Record 316) The 
Defendant worked as a custodian for the L.D.S. Church and the 
Plaintiff as a manager of a Subway Store and as a dispatcher for 
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a small police department when they first arrived in Utah. 
(Transcript of 3/1/94 at page 42) 
Defendant's parents have been intricately involved in the 
lives of the parties and their children. Since the move to Utah, 
the parties have lived in a home purchased by Defendant's 
parents. The trial court found that without the aid of 
Defendant's parents, the parties "...would have faced financial 
ruin long ago.." (Finding 18 & 28, Record 316) 
Defendant's parents advanced $66,333 to start and maintain a 
feed business run by the parties since 1987. (Transcript of 
3/1/94 at 162) When it was opened, Defendant continued his 
custodian employment at night and worked at the store during the 
day. Plaintiff quit her job to work at the store. (Transcript 
of 3/1/94 at page 65) Defendant's parents also worked in the 
business. (Transcript of 3/1/94, pages, 92, 159, and 166) When 
the divorce complaint was filed, Defendant took over the full 
time management of the business by agreement and court order. 
(Transcript of 3/1/94 at 159 and Record 92) 
Defendant and his brother worked for their parents in the 
family mortuary business for years prior to this marriage. When 
the mortuary business was sold, the parents decided to give 
Defendant his share of the sale proceeds based on the work he had 
put into the mortuary business when he was younger. (Transcript 
of 3/1/94 at page 157) 
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Defendant's parents also purchased the home where the 
parties resided since 1984. The purchase price was $45f000, but 
Defendant's parents also spent $3,744 for repairs and in 1986, 
approximately $79,500 to remodel and double the size of the home. 
(Transcript of 3/1/94, at pages 10, 12, 155, Hecord 316, Findings 
27, 28, 29, & 30 and Record 316, Exhibit #6) The parties never 
paid any rent for the home, but did pay some taxes. (Record 361, 
Finding 29) 
In 1989, Defendant's parents deeded one third (1/3) of the 
property to the parties as joint tenant. According to undisputed 
trial testimony, this was done to avoid marital difficulties 
between the parties. (Record 361, Finding 39 and Transcript of 
3/1/94 at page 178 and 158) 
Again in 1990, Defendant's parents deeded another one-third 
(1/3) of the property to the parties for the same reasons and 
made a final deed in 1991. Three (3) deeds were used for tax 
purposes. (Record 361, Finding 29) The court found the value of 
the home as $125,000, however, Defendant's parents had spent 
$128,244 on the home. (Record 361, Finding 47 and Exhibit 6) 
Elizabeth Stewart, Ph.D., performed a custody evaluation at 
a cost of $3100.00; each party was ordered and did paid one-half 
of this cost prior to trial. (Record 92) Plaintiff called Doctor 
Stewart to testify at trial. (Transcript of 1/20/94) She was of 
the opinion that Defendant must prove Plaintiff unfit in order to 
v 
obtain custody. (Record 189) 
The custody and visitation issues were heard January 20, 
1994 and the rest of the issues on March 1, 1994. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant maintains that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error when it treated the assets of the parties as 
marital assets rather than separate assets and when it assumed 
that the mother should have custody of the children absence a 
finding of unfitness of the mother. 
The trial court also committed prejudicial error when it 
required Defendant to pay for the cost of having the court 
appointed evaluator testify for Plaintiff, when the court imputed 
income to Defendant for support purposes, and when it accepted 
Plaintiff's word that $7,000 was owed to the children's trust 
without requiring documentary evidence. 
ARGUMENTS 
CUSTODY & VISITATION 
When the parties separate, the temporary order allowed 
Plaintiff to remain in the home with the children and granted the 
parties joint custody. (Record 92) Defendant moved only one (1) 
block with his parents. (Record 361, Finding 4) This order 
appears to have given Plaintiff an advantage over Defendant in 
the custody decision of the court. 
The trial court found that joint custody was in the best 
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interest of the children, but awarded physical placement to the 
mother because she was in the home. (Record 361 Findings 25 & 48) 
The trial court found that both parents were good parents, 
and left the children with Plaintiff because she was in the home 
and had been since the separation. (Record 361, Finding 48 & 49) 
In fact, all of the testimony showed that Defendant was an 
exceptional father and involved in the lives of his children more 
than the "average" father. (Discussed hereafter.) Under the 
decision of the trial court, it would appear impossible for a 
father to ever obtain custody, absence a finding of unfitness of 
the mother. 
Utah Code §30-3.10 (1) & (2) reguires that the trial Court 
consider certain factors in determining custody. It states in 
pertinent part: 
"... in determining custody, the court shall consider the 
best interest of the child and the past conduct and 
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. The 
court may inguire of the child and take into consideration 
the child's desires regarding the future custody, but 
the express desires are not controlling and the court may 
determine the child's custody otherwise. 
"In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other 
factors the court finds relevant, which parents is most 
likely to act in the best interest of the child, including 
allowing the child freguent and continuing contact with the 
non-custodial parent as the court finds appropriate." 
The trial Court made findings regarding all of these 
elements and on each found that both parties were egual or that 
the weakness of one (1) was off set by other strengths. (Record 
i, 
361 Findings 6 through 25) This leads to the conclusions that 
the trial court must have applied an assumption that custody 
should go to a mother over a father if all things are equal. 
There is no statutory presumption in favor of a mother. Rice 
v. Rice, 564 P.2d 305 (Utah 1977) There was at one (1) time in 
Utah law, but his is an old rule that is now subordinate to the 
higher rule that custody should be based upon the best interest 
of the child. Briqham v. Briqham, 575 P.2d 703 (Utah 1978) 
Utah statutes do not contemplate any discrimination or 
inequality based on sex. Martinett v. Martinett, 331 P.2d 779 
(1961) Since no presumption exist in deciding custody, the trial 
court must make specific findings on the factors relied upon in 
awarding custody of a child to one (1) parent over another. 
Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1992) 
One (1) important consideration ignored by the trial court 
in this case was pointed out it Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 
1218 (Utah 1980) where the Utah Supreme Court held it is 
important in deciding custody to determine if one (1) parents has 
intentionally caused the children to be antagonistic toward the 
other parent. 
In Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990) Justice 
Greenwood pointed out the importance of considering such factors: 
"The best interests of a minor child are promoted by having 
the child respect and love both parents. 'Fostering a 
child's relationship with the noncustodial parent has an 
important bearing on the child's best interest 
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Visitation by the noncustodial parent helps to develop this 
bonding of respect and love. Interference by the custodial 
parent with a noncustodial parent's visitation rights as 
ordered by the court may clearly be contrary to the child's 
best interest. 
"We are persuaded....that interference with visitation may 
be a factor relevant to the issues of .... the child's best 
interest." 
Plaintiff admitted her negative actions toward Defendant in 
front of the children. She admitted that she had removed 
Defendant's photograph from family pictures, she admitted to 
calling Defendant names to the children, she admitted that she 
called Defendant a liar to the children, and she admitted that 
she had been obstructive in allowing the children to see 
Defendant. She also assaulted Defendant in front of the children. 
(Transcript of 1/20/94 at pages 124, 125, 128, 139 and 157) 
The trial court ignored the close involvement of the 
Defendant's parents in the lives of the children. The 
grandfather testified that he spent about 10 hours a week with 
the children while the grandmother testified to extensive time 
and involvement with the children each day, including providing 
day care. (Transcript of 1/20/94 at pages 171 and 174) 
It appears that the trial court accepted Dr. Stewart's 
conclusion that Plaintiff should have custody because Defendant 
had not proven her unfit. (Record 189) This is not proper. The 
trial court must makes its own determination as to custody and 
can not simply adopt the decision of a custody evaluator. 
? 
Robinson v. Myers, 599 P.2d 513 (Utah 1979) 
Elizabeth Stewart's custody evaluation was not helpful to 
the Court. She made a lot of mistakes. For example, she did no 
psychological tests; her recommendations were based solely on 
interviews with the parties and the children; she made little, if 
any, collateral contacts, she did not visit the homes of the 
parties, and she made no effort to confirm any of the information 
given by the parties. (Transcript of 1/20/94 at page 37) 
Doctor Stewart admitted that Defendant is much more involved 
in and concerned about his children than the "average" father. 
Doctor Stewart testified: 
"In the recent year, prior to that time, Mr. Schwartz was 
certainly around, as I mentioned in the report, he did a 
good deal of the domestic work and for that reason he was 
around home much more than most fathers were. From the 
point of the physical care and time in the home and ability 
to maintain a domestic schedule, he can do that. 
...certainly Mr. Schwartz had a lot of time in the home, 
much more so than most fathers do and he had much more 
actual what I call "domestic experience" taking care of both 
the home and the children. 
(Transcript of 1/20/84 at pages 53-54) 
Defendant had Doctor Stewart's report reviewed by another 
psychologist. Dr. Gale Stringham testified that Doctor Stewart's 
recommendations were inconsistent with her own report; 
(Transcript of 1/20/94 at page 90) Also that: 
1. She (Doctor Stringham) had worked in the mental health 
field for the past 17 years and had performed more than 100 
custody evaluation for the Third and Fourth District Courts. 
2. She had not met with Mrs. Schwartz nor the children, 
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but that she had reviewed the report of Doctor Stewart and 
meet with Mr, Schwartz for two (2) hours. 
3. The criteria used by psychologist to do custodial 
evaluations included those in the Utah Code as well as 
standard psychological testing, to include standardized test 
in intelligence measure, standardized testing for 
personality and pathology measures, clinical interviews, and 
observation of each parent with the children to determine 
how the children react and respond to the parent, 
4. Custody evaluations should also include collateral 
sources contacts to add information to the clinical 
impressions that are achieved through the testing and the 
clinical interviews. (Transcript of 1/20/94 from 67 to 90) 
Regarding Doctor Stewart's report, Doctor Stringham 
testified that the Steward report did not meet the standards 
expected in a custodial evaluation because Doctor Stewart had 
done little or no psychological testing, she make little or no 
collateral source contacts, and that Doctor Steward had not 
followed the standard protocol for custody evaluations. 
Doctor Stringham was also concerned about Plaintiff's 
negative conduct about Defendant in front of the children. 
MR. COLLINS: And if there was a situation where one of the 
parents was providing negative information, in this case I 
think you read the report where the mother admits saying 
negative things about the father, what type of affect would 
that have on the testing procedure? In other words, would 
there be indicated additional follow up under those 
circumstances? 
DR. STRINGHAM: If I had an evaluation such as this where 
the one party acknowledged that they had said negative 
things regarding the other party around the children or 
where the children could overhear, I would be particularly 
concerned about how that was affecting the child. 
(Transcript of 1/20/94 from 69 to 90) 
When Doctor Stewart's lack of a proper protocol for a 
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custody evaluations is considered, it is obvious that the trial 
court must have accepted Doctor Stewart's premiss; i.e. that 
since Defendant had not proven Plaintiff unfit, he was not 
entitled to physical custody. 
IMPUTED INCOME 
Did the trial court improperly impute income to Defendant? 
Defendant terminated his custodian job in November 1992 as a 
joint decision of the parties and now manages the feed business 
full time. (Finding 69, Record 361) The parties agreed at the 
original temporary hearing that the business could only support 
paying Defendant $1,000 a month. (Record 92) 
The trial court disregarded this admission by Plaintiff and 
found that Defendant had taken $9,000 from the business as 
unexplained "draws". (Finding 70, Record 361) The trial court 
also found that Defendant's parents had given an additional 
$21,333,30 to Defendant for the business since separation of the 
parties in February 1993. (Finding 54. Record 361). 
For some reason, the court then took the $9,000 which was 
obviously from the $21,333.30 loan money and called that 
Defendant's extra income and used it to calculate child support. 
(Finding 76, Record 361) Plaintiff's CPA testified that this 
$9,000 was taken by Defendant against capital and was not income 
and was explained by Defendant. (Transcript of 3/1/95 at page 30) 
Since Plaintiff ran the business before the temporary order, 
/ / 
it must be presumed that she had knowledge what could be paid 
from the business for management. (Record 92) 
The trial court imputed income to Defendant (Record 361, 
Finding 76) at his pre-separation earnings rate. The trial court 
did so by including the $9,000 loan money. (Record, Findings 69 & 
76) The reasoning of the trial court was that the children 
deserved such a finding. (Record 361, Finding 76) 
The trial court did not make the findings required by Utah 
Code §78-45-7.5(7)(a). A trial court may impute income so long as 
it follows the requirements of the code 7 which states: 
"Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent 
stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a 
finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed." 
In order for a court to impute income for the purpose of 
increasing child support, the trial court must first find that at 
the time of trial the spouse is intentionally unemployed or 
underemployed. Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722 (Utah App. 1992). 
Failure make such a finding is an abuse of discretion. There was 
not such finding in this case. The trial court simply found that 
Defendant voluntarily terminated his employment prior to 
separation. (Record 361, Finding 71) 
The evidence supports the fact that Defendant was not 
unemployed nor voluntarily underemployed. The parties and 
Defendant's parents had a substantial investment in the feed 
business and the court found that Defendant was protecting this 
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The trial court ignored the fact that all checks for the 
home were written either to the Defendant or to the construction 
workers and none of the checks were ever written to Plaintiff. 
(Record 351, Exhibit 6) 
The way checks are written is important in deciding the 
intent of a gift in such situations. See Osquthorpe v. 
Osquthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah App. 1990) where the husband's 
parents gave both parties substantial cash payments during the 
marriage, but the checks were payable to both parties. 
Defendant's parents were very careful to insure that each 
check was made out to Defendant and not to both of the parties. 
(Record 361, Exhibit 6) This is clear evidence of their intend 
was to give these funds to Defendant and not as a joint gift. 
Defendant's parents never requested a return of the funds 
for the home as they did the funds use to start the feed 
business. (Record 361, Finding 67) 
A trial court can distribute separate property to the other 
spouse regardless of how title is held, but must set forth its 
reasons clearly in its findings. Huck v. Huck/ 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 
1986 and Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987). 
The thrust of the trial court's decision is based on the 
status of the title to the home and the method of deeding the 
property for tax benefits. (Record 361, Finding 39 & 40) 
Defendant's parents did not understand the methods used to 
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h a v e an o v / n e r s i n p , * ^- , . , - . . * - o ; - , ^
 : , : 1 S 
d i v o r c e , ( R e c o r d 361 , - i i n l i n o 1 / \ . p i a ' - r * ', : * , - i o i . h o r / w i f e ) 
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testified to the contrary: 
MR. COLLINS: How about your ex-husband. For example, did 
you and he ever talk about it being his inheritance? 
MRS. J. SCHWARTZ: He talked about it was a gift from his 
parents and they wanted him to have it now. 
MR. COLLINS: Did he talk about it being his inheritance? 
MRS. J. SCHWARTZ: I believe at one time he stated it as 
such. 
MR. COLLINS: And this was prior to your filing for divorce? 
MRS. J. SCHWARTZ: Oh, yes. A couple of years. 
(Transcript of 3/1/94 at page 103) 
The Defendant had discussions with the Plaintiff about the 
inheritance and the property on many occasions. She was slow to 
admit it at trial, but it is clear from her testimony that she 
knew the home was intended as Defendant's inheritance and that 
she knew that the intent of Defendant's parents was that he 
receive the home as his inheritance. Defendant's testimony was 
also contrary to the finding of the trial court. He testified: 
MR. R. SCHWARTZ: We, no, because we knew it was my 
inheritance. I mean, that is why they purchased it for us. 
MR. COLLINS: How did you both know, that is my question. 
MR. R. SCHWARTZ: Well, because she knew that I grew up in 
the family business and when they sold the mortuary I had my 
inheritance, I decided to take it then to purchase the home. 
It was a home that we both decided we wanted to live in. 
MR. COLLINS: Did you discuss this information? 
MR. R. SCHWARTZ: We had discussed. She knew I had an 
inheritance coming from the mortuary, working there when I 
was growing up and so, I mean, she always knew that it was 
IL 
my ..inheritance, 
MR. COT.MNS: c:o ar, early a- r * ^ ; ^- - • -u ;ou/*-(i ; ,, i h ^ o 
was no quert i.on between you ami ^ h- • , ^ home 
represented -/OM>- inheritance? 
MR. P. SCHVVnv. ; M-^-. definitely. 
(Transcript ul J/1,94 at pa-.;o i q l^ i) 
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all parties are before it. 
TRUST ACCOUNT REPAYMENT 
Plaintiff testified that the parties had borrowed some money 
from the trusts accounts of the children in October or November 
1989. These accounts which were solely under Plaintiff's control 
and Defendant had not control over them. (Transcript of 3/1/94 at 
page 152) Defendant had no knowledge of this. (Record 361, 
Findings 63) 
There was no further evidence tendered by Plaintiff; no bank 
records even though they existed, no canceled checks and no 
records in the business. (Transcript of 3/1/94 at 148 to 152 and 
Record 361, Exhibit 16) 
All of the trust accounts and records were kept by Plaintiff 
at the time of the alleged loan. There was not sufficient 
evidence to support a findings that Defendant had removed $7,000 
from these trusts accounts to place in the business. 
Notwithstanding this lack of evidence, the trial court used 
this claim in off setting Defendant's interest in the property 
distribution. There was no further proof on this issue. These 
claims were not even alleged until trial. (Transcript of 3/1/94 
at page 152) 
PAYMENT OF WITNESS FEES 
The trial court found that neither party could afford to 
contribute to the fees of the other party and that Defendant did 
I* 
not hnvp th^ ability to pay aliir^-y, Th^ trial court a] so found 
that Plaint..! rf hp-.] \)^\ demonstrated a need for alimony. (Record 
361, V' -!c ; iur; I") thru ;••. '• ! ) 
The *r»al cour t ordered t h a t oac^i pa r ty pay one-had f (] /2) 
of ih^ r:n c: tody eva] uati on . (Recoi d 36 ] , FJ nd i ng 95 ) The trial 
*. r.,: . i >i i) e f e i I d a i 11 t o p a. y f o r I } ] a :i n t j f f ' s u s e o f 
poor oj Si-^wai I /•". tri.'M, but Pja:nt iff i no > udeu * h) r i; the 
ionorro .
 v ' • •» '
 iU
" -' '' ' , ; o^ t ~» 
r°qu:-T o T^ofMndani w> pay foi Pb*.nti{f's witnesses. 
SUMMARY 
This court should determine * iin;. *:^ ^ ^me was the sole and 
separate property of n^fcndani nun remand 4 * o case lor a 
determination as 1.<• r-w interest which Plaintiff may have as a 
resul t of mar l ta 1 o ;. j orts . 
Thin cnuri L - ^  ^  n I • sot r^sulr any M M M I ^ ; related t'> the feed 
business and direct the trial cour t to bring Defendant's parents 
before the court pri or to a determine of the I nterests of the 
parti.es ;- * he feed bi isi ness. 
This c o I i r t: s h o \ :i ] d s e t a s :i : 
Defendant or require specifi c f« id* no.; a,; i ••<.}(., !;•*•; y ^tauuto 
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acennnrr, of ;„hc 1 - : " - - - -^  TI r o* • - f ^ u ; p--.--f - •> • ^ n p i i r ^ t h e . Lai 
n 
court to reconsider distribution without consideration of the 
alleged loan. 
This court should remand the issue of custody for more 
specific findings as to the court's reasons for awarding custody 
to the mother and should direct the trial court to give the 
Defendant an equal opportunity at custody without consideration 
of sex. 
Finally, the Court should award an off set in the property 
division once properly decided by the trial court for Defendant's 
cost and attorney's fees on appeal. 
Respectfully Submitted 
C. ROBERT COLLINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DI 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRI K. SCHWARTZ, ) 
Plaintiff & Appellee, ) Case No. 934400154 
vs. ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
RANDALL I. SCHWARTZ, ) 
) Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
Defendant & Appellant. ) 
NOTICE is hereby given that Defendant and Appellant, RANDALL 
I. SCHWARTZ, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final 
judgment of the Honorable Judge Anthony W. Schofield, entered in 
this matter on June 1, 1994. The appeal is taken from those parts 
of the decision that deal with child custody, income, business 
property, the home and other financial matters to be hereafter set 
forth in the brief. 
Dated this 22nd day of June, 1994. 
fO> 
^V&Utt^ ,(juu&^WO\/a>^ 
listened to arguments of counsel, and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. Mother and Father are awarded joint legal custody of the four minor children, 
to-wit: Cari Jo Schwartz, age 12; Kelli Schwartz, age 10; Derek Schwartz, age 6; and Tyler 
Schwartz, age 3. 
2. Mother is awarded primary physical custody of the minor children. 
3. Father is awarded liberal visitation with the minor children, to include statutory 
visitation. 
4. Father is awarded five weeks of summertime visitation with the minor children, 
which visitation shall be divided into a two-week period and a three-week period. Plaintiff shall 
have a two-week period between the two visitation periods with Father. Mid-week visitation will 
end at 8:00 p.m. on school nights and 9:00 p.m. on non-school nights. Christmas holiday will 
alternate every year with one party having the children from the beginning of the school 
Christmas recess until December 26, and the other party having the children from December 26 
until the end of the school recess. The party having visitation starting after Christmas Day will 
get Thanksgiving visitation during that year. Father will pick up the children for visitation and 
Mother will pick up the children at the conclusion of visitation. Given the extent of mid-week 
visitation, no special visitation for children's birthdays will be provided. 
DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Our File No. 22,056 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JERRI K. SCHWARTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDALL I. SCHWARTZ, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 934400154 
Hon. Anthony W. Schofield 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on December 20, 1993, with 
respect to the issues of custody and visitation. The Court took the matter under advisement and 
entered its Memorandum Decision on January 19, 1994. Disposition of the home, business and 
personal property and issues of support were reserved for subsequent trial, held March 1, 1994. 
The Court issued its Ruling dated March 30, 1994. 
Don R. Petersen represented plaintiff ("Mother"), and C. Robert Collins represented 
defendant ("Father"). Having heard the testimony of witnesses, received documentary evidence 
A/T) 
9. It is hereby ordered that the evening-out of the various liabilities of the parties 
will occur by adjustment to the home equity owed by Mother to Father. 
Mother owes Father: 
$62,500 Home equity 
less 14,174 Business equity he owes her 
less 7,000 Mortgage debt she will pay 
plus 1,500 Excess of value of personal property 
Total: $42,826 
This amount is due from Mother to Father at the appointed time. This is equitable, as 
Mother has a home to live in but he does not. It is appropriate he not pay her the equity from 
the business until she pays him the equity from the home. This allows him maximum funds for 
the present time from which he can finance his own housing and living expenses. 
10. It is hereby ordered that Father is to replace into the children's trust accounts 
the sum of $7,000.00. To ensure the funds are available for the children, both parties are to be 
signatories on the children's trust accounts; withdrawals only can occur upon the child reaching 
18 or upon further order of the Court. These funds are to be replaced within one year of entry 
of the decree. 
11. It is hereby ordered that both parties are to share equally in the cost of the 
custodial evaluation. To the extent one party has borne a greater share of the cost than the 
other, that party is entitled to reimbursement from the other so that each pays an equal amount. 
5. The Court hereby adopts the parenting plan, Exhibit 17 and as amended by 
Exhibit 19. The parties may agree upon such additions or changes to the plan as they think 
appropriate, but are directed to execute the plan as amended hereby, unless they otherwise agree 
in writing on a different plan. 
6. The plaintiff mother, Jerri K. Schwartz, is awarded all right, title and interest 
in and to the home, which property is more specifically described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 1211.32 feet North and 230 feet West of 
the Southeast corner of the Southeast one-quarter of Section 
34, Township 5 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; thence West 100 feet; thence North 209.17 feet; 
thence South 88° 15' East 100.05 feet; thence South 206.11 
feet to beginning. 
7. The plaintiff mother is hereby awarded the horses, saddles and personal 
property as described in the Findings of Fact herein, but is liable for the mortgage, the 
difference in value of the personal property, and is hereby ordered to pay to Father his one-half 
equity in the home upon her remarriage, death, refinancing the home, or further encumbering 
it, cohabiting with another male, or the youngest child reaching age 18. 
8. The defendant father, Randall I. Schwartz, is awarded the business, the camper 
and personal property as described in the Findings of Fact, but is liable for repaying the 
children's trust accounts the amount which the business borrowed, and to pay Mother one-half 
of the value of the business. 
16. The Court finds that neither party has the ability to pay the other's attorney 
fees. Therefore, no attorney fees are awarded. 
17. In the custody decision, the Court directed the parties to agree on a parenting 
plan. They came close but did not complete the negotiation process. The Court therefore will 
direct appropriate adjustments to the draft parenting plan received as Exhibit 17 and the 
offsetting comments received as Exhibit 19 be made. 
18. Visitation, though liberal, only includes five weeks of summertime visitation 
with Father, whose visitation will be divided into a two-week period and a three-week period. 
Mother shall have a two-week period between the two visitation periods with Father. Mid-week 
visitation will end at 8:00 p.m. on school nights and 9:00 p.m. on non-school nights. The 
Christmas holiday will alternate every year, with one party having the children from the 
beginning of the school Christmas recess until December 26, and the other party having the 
children from December 26 until the end of the school recess. The party having visitation 
starting after Christmas Day will get Thanksgiving visitation during that year. Father will pick 
up the children for visitation, and Mother will pick up the children at the conclusion of 
visitation. Given the extent of mid-week visitation, no special visitation for the children's 
birthdays will be provided. Other than these modifications, the parenting plan, Exhibit 17, is 
adopted. The parties may agree upon such additions or changes to the plan as they think 
A-i 
12. The Court orders that there is an additional sum of $731.98 due and owing to 
Elizabeth B. Stewart, who performed the custodial evaluation. 
13. Pursuant to the guidelines, Father is ordered to pay to Mother child support in 
the sum of $495.00 per month. As Father has always paid child support and as he is an owner 
of the business rather than an employee, a withhold and deliver is not required unless subsequent 
evidence is provided which demonstrates a failure to pay on a timely basis. 
14. Mother is not awarded alimony. She is quite able to provide for her own care, 
particularly when the amount of child support is added in, as well as she has use of a home 
without rent or significant mortgage debt. While she claims need, it is not really demonstrated. 
She has income and support of around $1,500.00 per month. Her expenses are listed as 
$1,737.00 per month. Mother has control over the amount of riding lessons she teaches. As 
such, it appears she has capacity to earn the shortfall which exists between her income and her 
listed expenses. Mother anticipates completing schooling in amount 5 to 6 years; then, she 
anticipates sufficient income to meet her needs. 
15. The Court finds that Father does not have the ability to pay alimony. To a 
great extent, this family has lived on the generosity of Father's parents. While he has a legal 
obligation to his divorcing wife, his parents do not. The Court imputes income to him for 
purposes of protecting the children but will not do so where, with a modest stretch, Mother can 
provide for her own needs without receipt of alimony. 
DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 Our File No. 22,056 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JERRI K. SCHWARTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDALL I. SCHWARTZ, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 934400154 
Hon. Anthony W. Schofield 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on December 20, 1993, with 
respect to the issues of custody and visitation. The Court took the matter under advisement and 
entered its Memorandum Decision on January 19, 994. Disposition of the home, business and 
personal property and issues of support were reserved for subsequent trial, held March 1, 1994. 
The Court issued its Ruling dated March 30, 1994. 
Don R. Petersen represented plaintiff ("Mother"), and C. Robert Collins represented 
defendant ("Father"). Having heard the testimony of witnesses, received documentary evidence 
and listened to arguments of counsel, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
appropriate, but are directed to execute the plan, as amended hereby, unless they otherwise agree 
in writing on a different plan. 
DATED this / day of #ayfl994. 
BY THE COURT 
& -ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this day of May, 1994. 
C. Robert Collins, Esq. 
P. O. Box 243 
405 East State Road 
American Fork, UT 84003 
SECRETARY 
J:\DRPVSCHWARTZ.DEC 
10. Each of the parents desires custody of the children. 
11. Each of the parents desires that the children be kept together. 
12. Cari Jo, the oldest child, is a very sensitive young woman, demonstrably 
affected by the divorce proceedings. She has responded by becoming protective and caring for 
the younger children. She has been a source of genuine stability for the other children, 
shouldering a burden that a 12-year-old should not have to bear. In a sense, she is a surrogate 
parent for the younger children. 
13. Kelli is ten and is bright and able. She is a happy child that is resilient and less 
.troubled by circumstances than Cari Jo. She has a warm, loving relationship with both parents. 
14. Each of the two boys is active, inquisitive and warmhearted. Each is relatively 
unaware of all that the divorce implies, and each has a strong bond with both parents. 
15. Given the observed interaction of the children, they each would be best served 
by being kept together. It would be destructive to Cari Jo, who has a strong, protective nature 
for her siblings, to be separated from them. Equally, it would be damaging to Derek and Tyler, 
who rely to a large extent on their older sisters, to be separated from them. For the present, 
the children must be kept together. 
16. Cari Jo has a more strained relationship with Father than with Mother. He has 
not understood her as well and does not relate as well with her as does Mother. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds the following facts have been proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence: 
1. The parties were married in 1980 and are the parents of four children, to-wit: 
Cari Jo Schwartz, age 12; Kelli Schwartz, age 10; Derek Schwartz, age 6; and Tyler Schwartz, 
age 3. 
2. Each of the children is well-adjusted and each has significant interaction with 
both Father and Mother. 
3. Father's parents live near the marital home and have provided extensive child 
care over the years for each of the children. 
4. Under a temporary order, Mother has lived in the marital home. 
5. Under the temporary order, Mother has temporary custody of the children. 
6. By agreement between the parties, the children have visited with Father every 
other weekend and have had two mid-week visits with Father each week. 
7. The effect of the visitation schedule is that the children have retained a strong 
bond with both parents. Each has been able to spend considerable time with the children. 
8. The parties have been reasonably cooperative with each other to ensure the 
children have ready access to both parents. 
9. Mother has been particularly sensitive to have the children spend time with 
Father. 
(/ffy 
Father has been able to provide meaningful care to the children while they have been in his care 
for visitation. 
23. Tyler goes to Kinder Care day care. He also receives day care from his 
grandparents. This should be allowed to continue as he has a bond with his grandparents. 
24. Joint legal custody as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1 would be in the 
best interests of the children. 
a. Both parents appear capable of implementing joint legal custody as each 
has cooperated to a large extent in ensuring that the children have access to both parents. 
b. As the four children each have a significant bond with each parent, that 
bond would be fostered by a determination of joint legal custody. 
c. Each of the children has been well cared for physically, psychologically 
and emotionally. During the temporary period, the parents have been able to meet the needs 
of the children without undue difficulty. The children would continue to be cared for physically, 
psychologically and emotionally if an award of joint legal custody is entered. 
d. The parents have demonstrated an ability to give first priority to the 
welfare of their children and have been able so far to reach shared decisions in the best interests 
of the children. 
e. Each parent so far has been and is capable of encouraging positive 
relationships between the children and the other parent. The Court is impressed with the 
17. Each of the parents is morally responsible. Each has a commitment to teach 
values appropriate for our society and community. Each has similar religious values. Either 
would do well in exemplifying values for the children. 
18. Each of the parents is similarly situated with respect to financial understanding 
and money management. The family has received considerable financial support from 
grandparents of the children and neither parent has demonstrated a better ability to manage the 
family's financial resources than the other. Without the consistent support of grandparents, the 
family would have faced financial ruin long ago. 
19. Neither parent has personality quirks or particularly unrealistic expectations that 
would render that parent less fit to serve as custodial parent. 
20. Father is more rigid and somewhat less flexible than Mother. 
21. Mother is significantly involved in improving her lot through additional 
education. She tends to over-extend herself some as she works, goes to school, and has a major 
commitment to horse care and riding, which is both a hobby and an outlet for stress and 
frustration. 
22. While each parent has been a significant caregiver for the children, Mother has 
provided a greater portion of the parental care as between the parents, although Father's parents 
(the children's paternal grandparents) have provided considerable care for the children both in 
the form of day care as well as care in the marital home. Directly and through his parents, 
system. During that same time, the parties performed general maintenance and upkeep, and they 
paid for these smaller improvements. 
31. In 1991, Father's parents deeded the home to the parties as tenants in common. 
32. After 1991, there were minor improvements to the property, including 
construction of a hay barn and installation of a secondary irrigation water line. Monies for the 
hay barn came from the family budget. 
33. In August, 1992, the home was used as collateral to borrow $15,000.00, which 
was used to buy a 1986 Suburban and also horse trailers for business inventory. Mother has 
been paying interest only on that loan in the amount of $50.00 per month. 
34. Father asserts his parents told him the home was to be a gift to him, a part of 
his inheritance, and they wanted him to have it now so it could mutually benefit everybody, 
including the children. There was no similar discussion between the parents and Mother 
regarding it being Father's inheritance. 
35. As part of parents' estate planning, an attorney assisted parents with conveying 
the property. For tax purposes, the property was gifted to the parties over a period of three 
years. 
36. Parents executed the deed to the home at their attorney's office; neither of the 
parties were present nor had input into the form of the deed. 
37. Father never told Mother that the home was his property or that she did not 
have an ownership interest until after she filed for this divorce. 
maturity of the parents and the willingness they demonstrated to work cooperatively together in 
the best interests of the children. 
f. At present, the parents live just a few blocks apart. The children are 
able to walk between residences and to receive support from each parent. 
25. Based upon these findings, joint legal custody has a significant likelihood of 
working in this case, and each of the parents has demonstrated the ability to work cooperatively 
for the benefit of the children. 
26. The parties were married in 1980 and separated in early 1993. For more than 
three months preceding this action, the parties resided in Utah County. During the course of 
the marriage, irreconcilable differences arose between the parties making the continuation of the 
marriage impossible. Grounds and jurisdiction exist. 
27. Since 1984, the parties have lived in a home in Lindon, Utah, which was 
purchased by Father's parents. 
28. In 1986, a major addition of about 1000 square feet was added to the home. 
The addition was paid for by Father's parents. 
29. The parties never paid any rent for their occupancy of the house. For the years 
1987-1991, they did pay the property taxes on the house. 
30. Prior to 1991, the parties participated with Father's parents in improving the 
home by building a barn and installing a sprinkling system. The parents paid for the sprinkling 
46. The video tapes received in evidence depict the condition of the home shortly 
after the separation as well as its current condition. While very cluttered during the recent 
inspection and video (Exhibit 21), there has been some damage, not extensive damage. There 
were, for example, some new holes in the sheet rock walls and pencil and crayon scribbles on 
the walls. As the damage was not extensive, it does not appear significantly to decrease the 
value of the home. 
47. In other contexts, this Court has received evidence of a ten percent increase 
over that time period. While it cannot rely on that extrinsic evidence, the home does have a 
value greater than the 1992 appraisal. Given the appraiser's report and Mother's testimony that 
it could be sold for more than the 1992 appraisal, the home is valued at $125,000.00. 
48. Mother desires to live in the home. She has custody of the children and they 
have lived in the home since 1984. It is in the best interest of the children and Mother that they 
be permitted to reside in the home during the children's growing years. 
49. Mother is awarded the home. 
50. Father has an equity in the home of one-half of its value, or $62,500.00. 
51. In 1987, the parties started a business, a feed store in Lindon, Utah. 
52. To start the business, they borrowed $20,000.00 from Father's parents. Before 
separation, they borrowed an additional $25,000.00 from Father's parents. 
53. Neither of these loans was evidenced by a promissory note, nor were any terms 
of repayment or interest established for the loans. 
38. Mother asserts the home was deeded as tenants in common for the protection 
of the children and because she was more financially responsible than Father. 
39. Father's parents assert they deeded the home as tenants in common in order to 
keep peace in the family and because they thought the parties would be together forever. This 
explanation is somewhat lame as they would not have qualified for the tax treatment they sought 
if they had not deeded the home jointly; they would have had a gift tax obligation. Thus, the 
principal purpose for deed of the home in tenancy in common was for tax purposes. Clearly, 
the parents intended a gift both to their son as well as to his wife so they could avoid gift tax 
liability on the transfer. 
40. The home is a marital asset. 
41. In 1992, the home was appraised at $114,000.00. 
42. Jud Harward, an MAI appraiser, did a letter report as to the value of the home 
on February 25, 1994, of $125,000.00. 
43. Mother places a value on the home of $130,000.00 to $135,000.00. 
44. Father believes the home is worth less now than in 1992 because he asserts 
there has been fairly extensive damage to the home since the separation. 
45. Given the significant real property appreciation in this county during the year 
and a half since the valuation of the home, it undoubtedly has increased in value, unless it has 
suffered unusual depreciation or wear and tear. 
59. In support of Mother's claim, however, the truck which Father drives is owned 
by the business and not included in the value of fixed assets, though the debt against the truck 
was included in the liabilities. That truck has a value of $13,500.00. 
60. Ron King, the evaluator, noted that the depreciated value of business assets 
almost always is less than true market value. 
61. In light of all of the assets given or loaned to the business by Father's parents, 
together with reasonable depreciation, the value of the fixed assets seems somewhat low; 
however, other than the value of the truck, no clear evidence of value was provided. The fixed 
assets are valued at $11,000.00, plus $13,500.00, the value of the truck, a total of $24,500.00. 
62. Since the date of this account, Father's parents advanced additional funds, 
making total notes payable of $66,333.30. Since that date, the FSB loan was reduced to 
$7,000.00. 
63. The parties borrowed $7,000.00 from the children's trust accounts which the 
children received from Mother's family. These monies were used to pay bills for the business. 
Mother testified the parties intended to repay these loans with interest. Father testified he was 
not aware the money was borrowed. 
64. The amount of these loans from the children's trust accounts should be included 
as liabilities in the valuation of the business. 
65. If the balance sheet of the business is adjusted for fixed assets of $24,500.00, 
notes payable of $66,333.30, FSB bank loan of $7,000.00, and loan from children of $7,000.00, 
54. Since the separation in 1993, parents have loaned an additional $21,333.30 to 
Father for the business. For these loans to the business, parents are owed $66,333.30 by these 
parties, plus interest. 
55. While the company tax returns show Father as the owner of the business, the 
business was originally started for Mother to operate while Father maintained full-time 
employment elsewhere. 
56. These parties each are owners of the business. It was built from loans from 
Father's parents, but as both parties are liable for repayment of the loans, the business is a 
marital asset. 
57. As of 12/31/93, the business had the following assets and liabilities: 
Assets Liabilities 
Inventory $103,000 Accounts payable $ 23,800 
Fixed assets 11,000 Taxes payable 8,120 
Cash 9,600 Notes payable 55,957 
Accounts receivable 3.500 FSB bank loan 12.815 
Total: $127,100 $102,872 
Net Worth: $22,228 
58. Mother believes the amount of the fixed assets is understated by about 
$24,000.00; however, the description of fixed assets includes a fiberglass horse, a tractor, a 
heater and a Ford truck, which were purchased by Father's parents and loaned to the business. 
77. The total income of the parties is $2,758.00. Father receives 63% of the 
income. Based upon those amounts, for four children, total child support is $787.00, of which 
Father's share is $495.00. 
78. Six horses are being kept at the home of Mother. Of the six, Ariel belongs to 
Mother's mother. The remaining five belong to the parties and their children. Billy and Musket 
were brought to the marriage by Mother. She should have them. Cody should be awarded to 
Father and Tangent to Mother. The remaining pony belongs to the children and should be kept 
by them. 
79. The parties have seven saddles, one of which Mother brought to the marriage 
and one of which replaces a second saddle Mother brought to the marriage. Three saddles are 
for the children and are awarded to them. The remaining saddles, an English saddle, a western 
saddle, a dressage saddle and a Wintex saddle are divided the English, dressage and Wintex to 
Mother, and the western saddle to Father. 
80. Father brought History of the Church, Journal of Discourses, dictionary, 
pictures of Europe and much of the stereo system to the marriage. He should receive them. 
81. Mother brought the pony cart into the marriage, which she should receive. 
82. Father should receive the chairs from his family and the rocker which was a 
gift from his parents. 
83. Father should receive the following items from the marital estate: bed, electric 
piano, tools, clothes, stereo system, one-half of CD's and records and tapes, CD player, 
73. Mother is attending UVSC three-quarter time getting a degree in general 
education, and also works 24 to 34 hours per week. She intends to become a math teacher. She 
anticipates she will not graduate for at least five years. She has applied for a Pell grant which 
only covers books and tuition. She has not attempted to obtain student loans. 
74. Mother now earns about $896.00 per month from her employment. She also 
earns, after expenses, at least an average of $112.00 per month from horse training and horse 
riding lessons, making total income to her of $1,008.00 per month. It appeared that she actually 
earns more than this from her riding lessons and training, but the amount was unclear. 
75. Mother has been receiving child support in the amount of $304.00 per month. 
76. Father had income of $1,000.00 per month, but he also took the additional 
$9,000.00 draw in 1993, a total of $21,000.00. He thus had income in 1993 of $1,750.00 per 
month. It is appropriate that income be imputed to him in that amount as he has control over 
the store; its debts, other than debts to parents, have been reduced; he is able-bodied; and while 
working for the Church, he made even more. He now works in the store primarily to rescue 
his parents' investment. The children suffer from less support than they deserve if he is able 
to base his support on the monthly draws which he takes from the store, rather than on all of 
the income he took from the store last year, an amount more nearly like what he earned before 
working in the store. For purposes of calculating child support, Father's income is imputed at 
$1,750.00 per month. 
Thus, in arriving at a disposition of the assets and debts of the parties, she must receive credit 
for this debt, a business debt for which she will be responsible. 
89. Mother seeks alimony. 
90. Given the amount of his reasonable living expenses and child support, when 
contrasted with his income from the store, Father does not have the capacity to pay alimony. 
Even at $21,000.00, the amount of his income in 1993, he does not have the capacity to provide 
for his own needs, to pay child support and still pay alimony. Thus, although Mother seeks 
alimony, Father does not have capacity to pay. 
91. Nor does Mother demonstrate significant need. She receives income of 
$1,000.00 and she has support of $495.00. She asserts expenses of $1,737.00. Because she has 
control over the amount of riding lessons which she gives, she has control over her ability to 
pay her own way. 
92. Father's attorney fees are in the sum of $8,020.00, which appears necessarily 
incurred and reasonable in amount. 
93. Mother's attorney fees are in the sum of $5,125.00, which appears necessarily 
incurred and reasonable in amount. 
94. Neither party has the capacity to pay the other's fees. 
95. The cost of the custodial evaluation should be borne equally by the parties. To 
the extent not already done, each should pay one-half of the evaluation. 
computer, weight set, one-half kitchen appliances, one-half linens, one-half family pictures, one-
half games, one bookcase, TV and VCR, one-half of silverware and cookware, one set of 
clippers, hide-a-bed, green couch, stove, one-half of tack other than saddles, camper, one-half 
of videos. 
84. Mother should receive the following items from the marital estate: 
encyclopedias, piano, couch, TV and VCR, beds, dressers, refrigerator, one-half kitchen 
appliances, one-half linens, one-half family pictures, one-half games, children's encyclopedias, 
pipe corral, hot walker, one-half of silverware and cookware, horse clippers, wheelbarrow, one-
half of videos, one-half of CD's and records and tapes, one-half of tack other than saddles. 
85. The foregoing disposition of property is not fully inclusive of all items. The 
parties are to divide any unlisted items evenly between them. 
86. Given the values attributed to the items awarded to each from the marital estate, 
because Mother receives more horses and saddles, as well as the pipe corral and the hot walker 
while Father receives the camper, Father will receive less in value than Mother receives. The 
estimated difference in value is approximately $1,500.00. Father is entitled to receive that sum 
from Mother. 
87. The truck which Father drives is owned by the business. As he will keep the 
business, he gets the truck. Its value is included in the business valuation, as is its debt. 
88. The remaining balance of the First Security Bank home equity loan, a loan to 
the business, is secured by a mortgage on the home. Mother has agreed to pay this mortgage. 
2. While the Court orders joint legal custody, it concludes that primary physical 
custody should rest with Mother. Given the ages of the girls, Cari Jo's much closer bonding 
with her mother, and the express conclusion of all, including the Court, that the children be kept 
together, the Court concludes Mother is best suited to serve as the primary custodial parent. 
3. Liberal visitation is awarded to Father, to include the statutory visitation, 
augmented by allowing Father, so long as he lives close and it is convenient, to have the 
children visit more regularly after school in his parents' home and by allowirg Father to provide 
day care for Tyler personally or through Tyler's grandparents. 
4. The Court hereby approves the parenting plan drafted by the defendant and 
amended by the plaintiff. 
Disposition of Property. 
5. Mother is awarded the home, horses and saddles and personal property as 
described, but is liable for the mortgage, the difference in value of personal property, and must 
pay Father for his one-half equity in the ho^e upon her remarriage, death, refinancing the home 
or further encumbering it, cohabiting with another male, or the youngest child reaching age 18. 
Mother, Jerri K. Schwartz, is awarded all right, title and interest in and to the home, which 
property is more specifically described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 1211.32 feet North and 230 feet West of 
the Southeast corner of the Southeast one-quarter of Section 
34, Township 5 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; thence West 100 feet; thence North 209.17 feet; 
96. A legal description of the home belonging to the parties, which was purchased 
by Father's parents and awarded to the plaintiff mother is more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 1211.32 feet North and 230 feet West of 
the Southeast corner of the Southeast one-quarter of Section 
34, Township 5 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; thence West 100 feet; thence North 209.17 feet; 
thence South 88° 15' East 100.05 feet; thence South 206.11 
feet to beginning. 
97. The additional cost of the custodial evaluation not already paid for is the sum 
of $731.98. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing facts, the Court makes the following conclusions: 
1. Based upon the foregoing findings, the Court concludes that it is in the best 
interest of the children that an order of joint legal custody be entered. The Court commends 
both parents for their demonstrated ability to work cooperatively together for the benefit of he 
children. The separation of divorce and temporary decisions as to custody and visitation place 
great emotional strains upon parents who share a mutual love for their children. In this case, 
these parents have been able to work together in spite of that emotional strain. The Court finds 
that there is significant potential for success in a joint legal custody arrangement and orders joint 
legal custody. 
9. Both parties are to share equally in the cost of the custodial evaluation. To the 
extent one party has borne a greater share of the cost than the other, that party is entitled to 
reimbursement from the other so that each pays an equal amount. 
Child Support. 
10. Pursuant to the guidelines, child support is fixed at $495.00 per month. As 
Father has always paid child support and as he is an owner of the business rather than an 
employee, a withhold and deliver is not required unless subsequent evidence is provided which 
demonstrates a failure to pay on a timely basis. Father is hereby ordered to pay child support 
to Mother in the sum of $495.00 per month. 
Alimony. 
11. Mother would like alimony while she goes to school. Yet, she is quite able to 
provide for her own care, particularly when the amount of child support is added in. As well, 
he has use of a home without rent or significant mortgage debt. While she claims need, it was 
not really demonstrated. She has income and support of around $1,500.00 per month. Her 
expenses are listed as $1,737.00. Mother has control over the amount of riding lessons she 
teaches. As such, it appears she has capacity to earn the shortfall which exists between her 
income and her listed expenses. Mother anticipates completing schooling in about 5 to 6 years. 
Then she anticipates sufficient income to meet her needs. 
12. Nor does Father have the ability to pay alimony. To a great extent, this family 
has 1;ved on the generosity of Father's parents. While he has a legal obligation to his divorcing 
thence South 88° 15' East 100.05 feet; thence South 206.11 
feet to beginning. 
6. Father is awarded the business, the camper and personal property as described, 
but is liable for repaying the children's trust accounts the amount which the business borrowed, 
and to pay Mother one-half of the value of the business. 
7. The evening-out of the various liabilities of the parties to each other will occur 
by adjustment to the home equity owed by Mother to Father. 
Mother owes Father: 
$62,500 
less 14,174 
less 7,000 
plus 1.500 
Total: $42,826 
This amount is due from Mother to Father at the appointed time. This is equitable, as 
Mother has a home to live in but he does not. It is appropriate he not pay her the equity from 
the business until she pays him the equity from the home. This allows him maximum funds for 
the present from which he can finance his own housing and living expenses. 
8. Father is obligated to replace into the children's trust accounts the sum of 
$7,000.00. To ensure the funds are available for the children, both parties are to be signatories 
on the children's trust accounts; withdrawals only can occur upon the child reaching 18 or upon 
further order of the Court. These funds are to be replaced within one year of entry of the 
decree. 
4-2.6 
Home equity 
Business equity he owes her 
Mortgage debt she will pay 
Excess of value of personal property 
visitation. Given the extent of mid-week visitation, no special visitation for the children's 
birthdays will be provided. Other than these modifications, the parenting plan, Exhibit 17, is 
adopted. The parties may agree upon such additions or changes to the plan as they think 
appropriate, but are directed to execute the plan, as amended hereby, unless they otherwise agree 
in writing on a different plan. 
DATED this / ' day ofjiSy, 1994. 
BY THE COURT 
ANTHONY W. SCHOF1ELD 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this day of May, 1994. 
C. Robert Collins, Esq. 
P. O. Box 243 
405 East State Road 
American Fork, TJT 84003 
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wife, his parents do not. The Court imputes income to him for purposes of protecting the 
children but will not do so where, with a modest stretch, Mother can provide for her own needs 
without receipt of alimony. 
Attorney Fees. 
13. Neither party has the ability to pay the other's attorney fees. None are 
awarded. 
Parenting Plan. 
14. In the custody decision, the Court directed the parties to agree on a parenting 
plan. They came close but did not complete the negotiation process. The Court therefore will 
direct appropriate adjustments to the draft parenting plan received as Exhibit 17 and the 
offsetting comments received as Exhibit 19. 
15. Visitation, though liberal, only includes five weeks of summertime visitation 
with Father, whose visitation will be divided into a two-week period and a three-week period. 
Mother shall have a two-week period between the two visitation periods with Father. Mid-week 
visitation will end at 8:00 p.m. on school nights and 9:00 p.m. on non-school nights. The 
Christmas holiday will alternate every year, with one party having the children from the 
beginning of the school Christmas recess until December 26, and the other party having the 
children from December 26 until the end of the school recess. The party having visitation 
starting after Christmas Day will get Thanksgiving visitation during that year. Father will pick 
up the children for visitation, and Mother will pick up the children at the conclusion of 
more than three months preceding this action the parties resided in Utah County. 
During the course of the marriage irreconcilable differences arose between the parties 
making the continuation of the marriage impossible. Grounds and jurisdiction exist. 
2. Since 1984 the parties have lived in a home in Lindon, Utah which was 
purchased by Father's parents. 
3. In 1986 a major addition of about 1000 square feet was added to the 
home. The addition was paid for by Father's parents. 
4. The parties never paid any rent for their occupancy of the house. For 
the years 1987-1991, they did pay the property taxes on the house. 
5. Prior to 1991 the parties participated with Father's parents in imj , ng 
the home by building a barn and installing a sprinkling system. The parents pai/ ' r 
the sprinkling system. During that same time the parties performed general 
maintenance and up-keep and they paid for these smaller improvements. 
6. In 1991 Father's parents deeded the home to the parties as tenants ai 
common. 
7. After 1991 there were minor improvements to the property includi* g 
construction of a hay barn and installation of a secondary irrigation water line. 
Monies for the hay barn came from the family budget 
8. In August 1992 the home was used as collateral to borrow $15,00i 
which was used to buy a 1986 Suburban and also horse trailers for business 
inventory. Mother has been paying interest only on that loan in the amount of $50 
per month. 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRI K. SCHWARTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDALL I. SCHWARTZ, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: 934400154 
DATE: MARCH 30, 1994 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
Trial on the issues of custody and visitation was held December 20, 1993. 
The Court issued it's written decision on January 19, 1994. Disposition of the home, 
business and personal property and issues of support were reserved for subsequent 
trial, held March 1, 1994. 
Don R. Petersen represented plaintiff ("Mother") and C. Robert Collins 
represented defendant ("Father"). Having heard the testimony of witnesses, received 
documentary evidence and listened to arguments of counsel, the Court now makes its 
ruling. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds that the following facts have been proven by a preponderance 
of the evidence. 
1. Hie parties were married in 1980 and separated in early 1993. For 
16. In 1992 the home was appraised at $114,000. 
17. Jud Harward, an MAI appraiser, did a letter report as to the value of 
the home on February 25, 1994 of $125,000. 
18. Mother places a value on the home of $130 - $135,000. 
19. Father believes the home is worth less now than in 1992 because he 
asserts there has been fairly extensive damage to the home since the separation. 
20. Given the significant real property appreciation in this county during 
the year and a half since the valuation of the home, it undoubtedly has increased in 
value unless it has suffered unusual depreciation or wear and tear. 
21. The video tapes received in evidence depict the condition of the home 
shortly after the separation as well as its current condition. While very cluttered 
during the recent inspection and video (Exhibit 21), there has been some damage but 
not extensive damage. There were, for example, some new holes in the sheet rock 
walls and pencil and crayon scribbles on the walls. As the damage was not extensive, 
it does not appear significantly to decrease the value of the home. 
22. In other contexts this Court has received evidence of a ten percent 
increase over that time period. While it cannot rely on that extrinsic evidence, the 
home does have a value greater than the 1992 appraisal. Given the appraiser's report 
and Mother's testimony that it could be sold for more than the 1992 appraisal, the 
home is valued at $125,000. 
23. Mother desires to live in the home. She has custody of the children 
and they have lived in the home since 1984. It is in the best interest of the children 
9. Father asserts his parents told him the home was to be a gift to him, a 
part of his inheritance, and they wanted him to have it now so it could mutually 
benefit everybody including the children. There was no similar discussion between 
the parents and Mother regarding it being Father's inheritance. 
10. As part of parents' estate planning, an attorney assisted parents with 
conveying the property. For tax purposes the property was gifted to the parties over 
a period of three years. 
11. Parents executed the deed to the home at their attorney's office; neither 
of the parties were present nor had input into the form of the deed. 
12. Father never told Mother that the home was his property or that she did 
not have an ownership interest until after she filed for this divorce. 
13. Mother asserts the home was deeded as tenants in common for the 
protection of the children and because she was more financially responsible than 
Father. 
14. Father's parents assert they deeded the home as tenants in common in 
order to keep peace in the family and because they thought the parties would be 
together forever. This explanation is somewhat lame as they would not have qualified 
for the tax treatment they sought if they had not deeded the home jointly, they would 
have had a gift tax obligation. Thus, the principal purpose for deed of the home in 
tenancy in common was for tax purposes. Clearly the parents intended a gift both to 
their son as well as to his wife so they could avoid gift tax liability on the transfer. 
15. The home is a marital asset. 
Accts. Receivable 3.500 FSB Bank Loan 12.815 
TOTAL $127,100 $102,872 
Net Worth $24,228 
33. Mother believes the amount of the fixed assets is understated by about 
$24,000. However, the description of fixed assets includes a fiberglass horse, a 
tractor, a heater and a Ford truck which were purchased by Father's parents and 
loaned to the business. 
34. In support of Mother's claim, however, the truck which Father drives 
is owned by the business and not included in the value of fixed assets though the debt 
against the truck was included in the liabilities. That truck has a value of $13,500. 
35. Ron King, the evaluator, noted that the depreciated value of business 
assets almost always is less than true market value. 
36. In light of all of the assets given or loaned to the business by Father's 
parents, together with reasonable depreciation, the value of the fixed assets seems 
somewhat low, however other than the value of the truck, no clear evidence of value 
was provided. The fixed assets are valued at $11,000 plus $13,500, the value of the 
truck, for a total of $24,500. 
37. Since the date of this account, Father's parents advanced additional 
funds, making total notes payable of $66,333.30. Since that date the FSB loan was 
reduced to $7,000. 
38. The parties borrowed $7,000 from the children's trust accounts which 
the children received from Mother's family. These monies were used to pay bills for 
and Mother that they be permitted to reside in the home during the children's growing 
years. 
24. Mother is awarded the home. 
25. Father has an equity in the home of one half of its value, or $62,500. 
26. In 1987 the parties started a business, a feed store in Lindon, Utah. 
27. To start the business they borrowed $20,000 from Father's parents. 
Before separation they borrowed an additional $25,000 from Father's parents. 
28. Neither of these loans was evidenced by a promissory note nor were 
any terms of repayment or interest established for the loans. 
29. Since the separation in 1993, parents have loaned an additional 
$21,333.30 to Father for the business. For these loans to the business, parents are 
owed $66,333.30 by these parties, plus interest. 
30. While the company tax returns show Father as the owner of the 
business, the business was originally started for Mother to operate while Father 
maintained full time employment elsewhere. 
31. These parties each are owners of the business. It was built from loans 
from Father's parents, but as both parties are liable for repayment of the loans, the 
business is a marital asset. 
32. As of 12-31-93, the business had the following assets and liabilities: 
Assets Liabilities 
Inventory $103,000 Accounts Payable $ 23,800 
Fixed Assets 11,000 Taxes Payable 8,120 
Cash 9,600 Notes Payable 55,957 
store. He draws $1,000 per month from the business, although the accountant 
reviewing the books of the business testified that in 1993 Father also took a $9,000 
draw from the business which was not explained nor contradicted. 
46. Father has not sought other employment. He is trying to protect his 
parent's investment. 
47. Father is in good health. 
48. Mother is attending UVSC three-quarter time getting a degree in 
general education, and also works 24 to 34 hours per week. She intends to become a 
math teacher. She anticipates she will not graduate for at least five years. She has 
applied for a Pell grant which only covers books and tuition. She has not attempted 
to obtain student loans. 
49. Mother now earns about $896 per month from her employment. She 
also earns, after expenses, at least an average of $112 per month from horse training 
and horse riding lessons, making total income to her of $1,008 per month. It 
appeared that she actually earns more than this from her riding lessons and training, 
but the amount was unclear. 
50. Mother has been receiving child support in the amount of $304 per 
month. 
51. Fathef had income of $1,000 per month but he also took the additional 
$9,000 draw in 1993, a total of $21,000. He thus had income in 1993 of $1,750 per 
month. It is appropriate that income be imputed to him in that amount as he has 
control over the store; its debts, other than debts to parents, have been reduced; he is 
the business. Mother testified the parties intended to repay these loans with interest. 
Father testified he was not aware the money was borrowed. 
39. The amount of these loans from the children's trust accounts should be 
included as liabilities in the valuation of the business. 
40. If the balance sheet of the business is adjusted for fixed assets of 
$24,500, notes payable of $66,333, FSB bank loan of $7,000 and loan from children 
of $7,000, total assets are $140,600, total liabilities are $112,253, and the net value 
of the business is $28,347. That is the value which the Court places upon the 
business. One half of that value is $14,174. 
41. Father desires to retain ownership of the business so that he can work 
to recover for his parents their investment. It is appropriate that he be awarded the 
business. 
42. Post-separation Father's parents requested that the loans be reduced to 
written documentation and they requested repayment. While the Court will not so 
order, the parties do owe the parents the described sum and appropriate written 
evidence should be prepared. 
43. Father is still residing with his parents and is paying Mother support 
for the children. 
44. Prior to November 1992 Father worked for the L.D.S. Church as a 
custodian. Immediately before his voluntarily termination of employment with the 
church he was making $10.61 an hour, or approximately $1,800 per month. 
45. Following termination with the church, Father went to work at the feed 
should receive them. 
56. Mother brought the pony cart into the mat iage, which she should 
receive. 
57. Father should receive the chairs from his firmly and the rocker which 
was a gift from his parents. 
58. Father should receive the following items irom the marital estate: 
bed, electric piano, tools, clothes, stereo system, one hal of CD's and records and 
tapes, CD player, computer, weight set, one half kitchen appliances, one half linens, 
one half family pictures, one half games, one bookcase, VV and VCR, one half of 
silver ware and cook ware, one set of clippers, hide-a-bc/, green couch, stove, one 
half of tack other than saddles, camper, one half of video . 
59. Mother should receive the following items irom the marital estate: 
encyclopedias, piano, couch, TV and VCR, beds, dressi , refrigerator, one half 
kitchen appliances, one half linens, one half family pictu s, one half games, 
children's encyclopedias, pipe corral, hot walker, one h of silver ware and cook 
ware, horse clippers, wheelbarrow, one half of videos, half of CD's and records 
and tapes, one half of tack other than saddles. 
60. The foregoing disposition of property is &* fully inclusive of all items. 
The parties are to divide any unlisted items evenly betwc * them. 
61. Given the values attributed to the items a\ ded to each from the 
marital estate, because Mother receives more horses and ddles as well as the pipe 
corral and the hot walker while Father receives the canij , Father will receive less in 
7" 
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able-bodied; and while working for the church he made even more. He now works in 
the store primarily to rescue his parents' investment. The children suffer from less 
support than they deserve if he is able to base his support on the monthly draws 
which he takes from the store, rather than on all of the income he took from the store 
last year, an amount more nearly like what he earned before working in the store. 
For purposes of calculating child support Father's income is imputed at $1,750 per 
month. 
52. The total income of the parties is $2,758. Father receives 63% of the 
income. Based upon those amounts, for four children total child support is $787, of 
which Father's share is $495. 
53. Six horses are being kept at the home of Mother. Of the six, Ariel 
belongs to Mother's mother. The remaining five belong to the parties and their 
children. Billy and Musket were brought to the marriage by Mother. She should 
have them. Cody should be awarded to Father and Tangent to Mother. The 
remaining pony belongs to the children and should be kept by them. 
54. The parties have seven saddles, one of which Mother brought to the 
marriage and one of which replaces a second saddle Mother brought to the marriage. 
Three saddles are for the children and are awarded to them. The remaining saddles, 
an English saddle, a western saddle, a dressage saddle and a Wintex saddle are 
divided the English, dressage and Wintex to Mother and the western saddle to Father. 
55. Father brought History of the Church, Journal of Discourses, 
dictionary, pictures of Europe and much of the stereo system to the marriage. He 
68. Mother's attorney's fees are in the sum of $5,125, which appears 
necessarily incurred and reasonable in amount. 
69. Neither party has the capacity to pay the others fees. 
70. The cost of the custodial evaluation should be born equally by the 
parties. To the extent not already done, each should pay one half of the evaluation. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing facts the Court makes the following conclusions: 
Disposition of property• 
Mother is awarded the home, horses and saddles and personal property as 
described but is liable for the mortgage, the difference in value of personal property, 
and must pay Father for his one half equity in the home up m her remarriage, death, 
refinancing the home or further encumbering it, cohabiting with another male, or the 
youngest child reaching age eighteen. 
Father is awarded the business, the camper and personal property as described 
but is liable for repaying the children's trust accounts the amount which the business 
borrowed and to pay wife one half of the value of the business. 
The evening out of the various liabilities of the parties to each other will occur 
by adjustment to the home equity owed by Mother to Father. 
Mother owes Father: 
$62,500 Home equity 
less $14,174 business equity he owes her 
less $ 7,000 mortgage debt she will pay 
plus $ 1,500 excess of value of personal property 
TOTAL $42,826. 
L 
value than Mother receives. The estimated difference in value is approximately 
$1,500. Father is entitled to receive that sum from Mother. 
62. The truck which Father drives is owned by the business. As he will 
keep the business, he gets the truck. Its value is included in the business valuation, 
as is its debt. 
63. The remaining balance of the First Security Bank home equity loan, a 
loan to the business, is secured by a mortgage on the home. Mother has agreed to 
pay this mortgage. Thus, in arriving at a disposition of the assets and debts of the 
parties, she must receive credit for this debt, a business debt for which she will be 
responsible. 
64. Mother seeks alimony. 
65. Given the amount of his reasonable living expenses and child support , 
when contrasted with his income from the store, Father does not have the capacity to 
pay alimony. Even at $21,000, the amount of his income in 1993, he does not have 
the capacity to provide for his own needs, to pay child support and still pay alimony. 
Thus, although Mother seeks alimony, Father does not have capacity to pay. 
66. Nor does Mother demonstrate significant need. She receives income of 
$1,000 and she has support of $495. She asserts expenses of $1,737. Because she 
has control over the amount of riding lessons which she gives, she has control over 
her ability to pay her own way. 
67. Father's attorney's fees are in the sum of $8,020, which appears 
necessarily incurred and reasonable in amount. 
claims need, it was not really demonstrated. She has income and support of around 
$1,500 per month. Her expenses are listed as $1,737. Mother has control over the 
amount of riding lessons she teaches. As such, it appears she has capacity to earn the 
shortfall which exists between her income and her listed expenses. Mother anticipates 
completing schooling in about 5-6 years. Then she anticipates sufficient income to 
meet her needs. 
Nor does Father have the ability to pay alimony. To a great extent this family 
has lived on the generosity of Father's parents. While he has a legal obligation to his 
divorcing wife, his parents do not. The Court imputes income to him for purposes of 
protecting the children but will not do so where with a modest stretch, Mother can 
provide for her own needs without receipt of alimony. 
Attorney's fees. 
Neither party has the ability to pay the other's attorney's fees. None are 
awarded. 
Parenting plan. 
In the custody decision the Court directed the parties to agree on a parenting 
plan. They came close but did not complete the negotiation process. The Court 
therefore will direct appropriate adjustments to the draft parenting plan received as 
exhibit 17 and the offsetting comments received as exhibit 19. 
Visitation, though liberal, only includes five weeks for summer time visitation 
with Father, whose visitation will be divided into a two week period and a three week 
period. Mother shall have a two week period between the two visitation periods with 
This amount is due from Mother to Father at the appointed time. This is equitable as 
Mother has a home to live in but he does not. It is appropriate he not pay her the 
equity from the business until she pays him the equity from the home. This allows 
him maximum funds for the present from which he can finance his own housing and 
living expenses. 
Father is obligated to replace into the children's trust accounts the sum of 
$7,000. To ensure the funds are available for the children, both parties are to be 
signatories on the children's trust accounts; withdrawals only can occur upon the child 
reaching eighteen or upon further order of the Court. These funds are to be replaced 
within one year of entry of the decree. 
Both parties are to share equally in the cost of the custodial evaluation. To the 
extent one party has born a greater share of the cost than the other, that party is 
entitled to reimbursement from the other so that each pays an equal amount. 
Child support. 
Pursuant to the guidelines, child support is fixed at $495 per month. As 
Father has always paid child support and as he is an owner of the business rather than 
an employee, withhold and deliver is not required unless subsequent evidence is 
provided which demonstrates a failure to pay on a timely basis. 
Alimony. 
Mother would like alimony while she goes to school. Yet, she is quite able to 
provide for her own care, particularly when the amount of child support is added in. 
As well, she has use of a home without rent or significant mortgage debt. While she 
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ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
Trial on the issue of custody and visitation was held December 20, 
1993. All other issues were reserved for trial on March 1, 1994. Don R. 
Peterson represented plaintiff ("Mother") and C. Robert Collins represented 
defendant ("Father"). The Court heard the testimony of witnesses, received the 
documentary evidence, and heard the arguments of counsel. On January 5, 
1994 the Court interviewed the children in chambers. The Court now makes its 
ruling. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds that the following facts have been proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
1. The parties were married in 1980 and are the parents of four 
children: Cari Jo Schwartz, age 12 
Kelli Schwartz, age 10 
Derek Schwartz, age 6 
Tyler Schwartz, age 3. 
Father. Mid-week visitation will end at 8:00 p.m. on school nights and 9:00 p.m. on 
non-school nights. The Christmas holiday will alternate every year, with one party 
having the children from the beginning of the school Christmas recess until December 
26 and the other party having the children from December 26 until the end of the 
school recess. The parly having visitation starting after Christmas day will get 
Thanksgiving visitation during that year. Father will pick up children for visitation 
and Mother will pick up the children at the conclusion of visitation. Given the extent 
of mid-week visitation, no special visitation for the children's birthdays will be 
provided. Other than these modifications, the parenting plan, exhibit 17, is adopted. 
The parlies may agree upon such additions or changes to the plan as they think 
appropriate, but are directed to execute the plan, as amended hereby unless they 
otherwise agree in writing on a different plan. 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Mother's 
counsel is directed to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law and a decree of 
divorce consistent with the findings in this and the custody decision and to circulate 
them to counsel. 
Dated this 30th day of March, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
y 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
cc: Don R. Petersen, Esq. 
C. Robert Collins, Esq. 
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source of genuine stability for the other children, shouldering a burden that a 
12-year old should not have to bear. In a sense, she is a surrogate parent for 
the younger children. 
13. Kelli is ten, and is bright and able. She is a happy child that is 
resilient and less troubled by circumstances than Cari Jo. She has a warm, 
loving relationship with both parents. 
14. Each of the two boys is active, inquisitive and warm-hearted. 
Each is relatively unaware of all that the divorce implies and each has a strong 
bond with both parents. 
15. Given the observed interaction of the children, they each would 
be best served by being kept together. It would be destructive to Cari Jo, who 
has a strong, protective nature for her siblings, to be separated from them. 
Equally, it would be damaging to Derek and Tyler, who rely to a large extent 
on their older sisters, to be separated from them. For the present, the children 
must be kept together. 
16. Cari Jo has a more strained relationship with Father than with 
Mother. He has not understood her as well and doesn't relate as well with her 
as does Mother. 
17. Each of the parents is morally responsible. Each has a 
commitment to teach values appropriate for our society and community. Each 
has similar religious values. Either would do well in exemplifying values for 
(he children. 
2. Each of the children are well-adjusted and each has significant 
interaction with both Father and Mother. 
3. Father's parents live near the marital home and have provided 
extensive child care over the years for each of the children. 
4. Under a temporary order, Mother has lived in the marital home. 
5. Under the temporary order, Mother has temporary custody of the 
children. 
6. By agreement between the parties, the children have visited with 
Father every other weekend and have had two midweek visits with Father each 
week. 
7. The effect of the visitation schedule is that the children have 
retained a strong bond with both parents. Each has been able to spend 
considerable time with the children. 
8. The parties have been reasonably cooperative with each other to 
insure the children have ready access to both parents. 
9. Mother has been particularly sensitive to have the children spend 
time with Father. 
10. Fach of the parents desires custody of the children. 
11. Fach of the parents desires that the children be kept together. 
12. Cari Jo, the oldest child, is a very sensitive young woman, 
demonstrably affected by the divorce proceedings. She has responded by 
becoming protective and caring for the younger children. She has been a 
with his grandparents. 
24. Joint legal custody as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1 
would be in the best interests of the children. 
a. Both parents appear capable of implementing joiiit legal 
custody as each has cooperated to a large extent in insuring that 
the children have access to both parents. 
b. As the four children each have a significant bond with 
each parent, that bond would be fostered by a determination of 
joint legal custody. 
c. Each of the children has been well cared for physically, 
psychologically and emotionally. During the temporary period 
the parents have been able to meet the needs of the children 
without undue difficulty. The children would continue to be 
cared for physically, psychologically and emotionally if an award 
of joint legal custody is entered. 
d. The parents have demonstrated an ability to give first 
priority to the welfare of their children and have been able so far 
to reach shared decisions in the best interests of the children. 
e. Each parent so far has and is capable of encouraging 
positive relationships between the children and the other parent. 
The Court is impressed with the maturity of the parents and the 
willingness they demonstrated to work cooperatively together in 
18. Each of the parents is similarly situated with respect to financial 
understanding and money management. The family has received considerable 
financial support from grandparents of the children and neither parent has 
demonstrated a better ability to manage the family's financial resources than the 
other. Without the consistent support of grandparents, the family would have 
faced financial ruin long ago. 
19. Neither parent has personality quirks or particularly unrealistic 
expectations that would render that parent less fit to serve as custodial parent. 
20. Father is more rigid and somewhat less flexible than Mother. 
21. Mother is significantly involved in improving her lot through 
additional education. She tends to over extend herself some as she works, goes 
to school, and has a major commitment to horse care and riding, which is both 
a hobby and an outlet for stress and frustration. 
22. While each parent has been a significant care giver for the 
children, Mother has provided a greater portion of the parental care as between 
the parents although Father's parents (the children's paternal grandparents) have 
provided considerable care for the children both in the form of day care as well 
as care in the marital home. Directly and through his parents, Father has been 
able to provide meaningful care to the children while they have been in his care 
for visitation. 
23. Tyler goes to Kinder Care day care. He also receives day care 
from his grandparents. This should be allowed to continue as he has a bond 
Liberal visitation is awarded to Father, to include the statutory 
visitation, augmented by allowing Father, so long as he lives close and it is 
convenient, to have the children visit more regularly after school in his parents' 
home and by allowing Father to provide day care for Tyler personally or 
through Tyler's grandparents. 
The Court could spell out precise terms of the joint legal cir \ 1y order 
and a precise visitation and day care schedule. Rather, however, given the 
time until trial of the remaining issues in this divorce proceeding, the Court 
orders the parties to meet together, with their attorneys within fifteen (15) days, 
to develop a co-parenting plan and a visitation and child care schedule which is 
in the best interests of the children and which provides for liberal visitation 
with Father and the ability by him and his parents to provide child care service 
for Tyler. If the parties are unable to develop a co-parenting plan within 
fifteen (15) days after such meeting the Court orders mediation as to such 
issues. These parties have accomplished much cooper; ively. They are 
ordered to attempt to resolve these remaining issues cc peratively. 
This is an interim order so no formal findings and conclusions need be 
prepared at this time. At the time of final hearing the ourt will order one of 
the parties to prepare findings and conclusions as to the issues resolved in this 
the best interests of the children. 
f. At present the parents live just a few blocks apart. The 
children are able to walk between residences and to receive 
support from each parent. 
25. Based upon these findings, joint legal custody has a significant 
likelihood of working in this case and each of the parents has demonstrated the 
ability to work cooperatively for the benefit of the children. 
DECISION 
Based upon the foregoing findings, the Court concludes that it is in the 
best interest of the children that an order of joint legal custody be entered. The 
Court commends both parents for their demonstrated ability to work 
cooperatively together for the benefit of the children. The separation of divorce 
and temporary decisions as to custody and visitation place great emotional 
strains upon parents who share a mutual love for their children. In this case 
these parents have been able to work together in spite of that emotional strain. 
The Court finds that there is significant potential for success in a joint legal 
custody arrangement and orders joint legal custody. 
While the Court orders joint legal custody, it concludes that primary 
physical custody should rest with Mother. Given the ages of the girls, Cari 
Jo's much closer bonding with her mother and the express conclusion of all, 
including the Court, that the children be kept together, the Court concludes 
Mother is best suited to serve as the primary custodial parent. 
decision. 
Dated this 19th day of January, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
N^THON"YJ W. SCHOFltiLD; Jl A N / S C I E L J U D G E 
cc: Don R. Petersen, Esq. 
C. Robert Collins, Esq. 
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